INTRODUCTION
Fiscal consolidation is at the top of the agenda of many governments, both in industrial and developing countries as well as in countries in transition from socialist to market economies. In the Western European economies, this has been particularly true because the convergence criteria for monetary union have implied that practically all potential members have had to reduce their fiscal deficits considera-bly. Although fiscal consolidation is feared to dampen the still-fragile growth prospects or even to have led to a recession in some European economies, there have been a few cases in the past in which fiscal consolidation had a positive effect on aggregate demand and output. The fiscal consolidation in Denmark at the beginning of the 1980s has been the most prominent example and was still quoted in the International Monetary Fund's (IMF's) World Economic Outlook of May 1995. The element of the Danish outcome that has surprised policy makers and economists most has been the surge in private consumption following the severe fiscal consolidation of late 1982. Hence, our article, as with earlier papers on the Danish experience, focuses on the link between fiscal consolidation and private consumption and leaves aside investment. Although investment rose strongly and played an important role in the overall expansion, its determinants are obviously different from those of consumption, and it is also more driven by purely cyclical factors.
Previous work has explained the seemingly contradictory outcome of large cuts in public expenditure in combination with rises in private consumption by changes in expectations. Specifically, expectations of lower future tax burdens, as has been argued, triggered the boost of private consumption. Arguments of this type have recently been referred to as the "expectations view of fiscal policy." This view contends that current policy operations cause changes in expectations about future policies, and these changes in expectations explain the nonstandard effects of the current policy operations. 1 This article does not aim at downplaying the role of expectations about future policies in determining current economic outcomes; on the contrary, it rests on the view that expectations are so relevant that they ought to be reflected in some economic variables. In particular, it argues that in the cases of severe fiscal consolidation, expectations about future real interest rates may serve as such a variable, condensing expectations about future economic developments and explaining seemingly paradoxical consequences of expenditure cuts on total demand. This study reexamines the case of Denmark and tests whether a model encompassing the effect of the expected real interest rate on consumption can help explain the boost of private consumption following fiscal consolidation. The results show that this indeed seems to be the case. Once the change in interest rates is taken into account, the effect on private demand is not out of line with traditional theory. In other words, the so-called "consumption puzzle," found in previous studies, vanishes if the interest rate is used as a further explanatory variable in demand. This is in line with the interpretation of the Danish case in the IMF's World Economic Outlook (IMF 1995, 24) , which stresses the key importance of interest rates in determining the trend of private demand.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the Danish policy experience, and Section 3 presents the empirical estimation of the consumption equations with the interest rate included. Section 4 separates the "surprises" in the path of future taxes and decline of interest rates from one another to determine their relative explanatory power in the expansion. Section 5 derives and estimates an aggregate consumption function as an alternative to the representative agent model. Section 6 discusses some policy implications of the findings.
THE DANISH FISCAL TURNAROUND AND ITS INTERPRETATIONS IN THE LITERATURE
The Danish fiscal turnaround of late 1982 was preceded by 3 years of a strongly expansionary fiscal policy, which had been put in place in reaction to the oil crisis of 1979. During this time, the Danish government had tried to simultaneously address the high current account deficit and rapidly rising unemployment following the oil crisis by shifting demand from import-intensive private demand to public demand (via higher taxes) and, within public demand, by shifting from import-intensive investment to public consumption. Consequently, on average, from 1979 to 1982 and in real terms, private consumption fell by 2.5%, public investment fell by 14%, and public consumption expanded by 3.5%. In addition, the Danish kroner was devalued four times within the EMS to support the switch from imports to domestic demand.
This policy, however, proved to be neither successful nor sustainable. The general government deficit rose from 1.7% to 9.2% of gross domestic product (GDP) in the 3 years until 1982, long-term interest rates climbed from 16% to 20% while inflation remained at 10%, and the economy as a whole contracted. Unemployment rose from 7% to 10%, and the current account worsened from 3% to 4% of GDP. At the end of 1982, "the situation was considered disastrous, and it was feared that the Danish welfare state was eroding" (Andersen 1994, 100) .
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These developments led to the replacement of the social democrat government with a liberal-conservative coalition government in late 1982, which performed a turnaround in economic policy. The working hypothesis of the new government was that the economic problems could only be solved in the medium term and by expanding the private sector and reducing the public sector. Accordingly, public consumption and transfers were reduced, price indexation of most transfers was abolished, and taxes increased. The fiscal situation improved rapidly, from a deficit of 9% of GDP in 1982 to a surplus of 3% in 1986. According to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimates, three quarters of this improvement was due to discretionary policy changes, and only one quarter was due to cyclical improvements in the economy (OECD 1987, 100) .
At the same time, monetary policy was eased considerably. As a result of this easing and the government's announcement of a stable exchange rate, the interest rate differential between domestic and foreign government bonds narrowed significantly, from 14% in late 1982 to 7% in late 1983, and government bond yields in Denmark fell from more than 20% to 14% over the same period. Although nominal longterm interest rates in Germany, for example, declined by just about 1 percentage point during 1983, they fell by more than 6 percentage points in Denmark.
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The effect on the overall economy was remarkable. Private consumption and investment began to boom, GDP growth reached 4% in 1985, and unemployment began to decline. 4 The severe fiscal consolidation led to a substantial expansion of private demand and output.
What were the main driving forces behind these developments? A few explanations have been offered by German economists, in which the underlying view of fiscal policy was supposedly first developed. The most influential contribution, however, has been that of Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) . We will briefly discuss these contributions in order and then develop our analysis.
The first explanation of the surprising outcome of fiscal consolidation has been given by the German Council of Economic Experts, which advised fiscal consolidation as a means of boosting private demand and fighting the recession in Germany in 1981. 5 As in Denmark, the consolidation actually led the economy as a whole to expand.
6 According to the council, this outcome has been due to the fact that a credible fiscal contraction, in the form of a lasting cut in expenditure growth, has signaled a permanent reduction in future taxes and therefore an increase in future disposable income. Forward-looking consumers expand consumption demand immediately, which may outweigh the negative Keynesian multiplier effect of the public contraction (see Fels and Froehlich 1987; Hellwig and Neumann 1987) .
The seminal empirical study of expansionary effects of fiscal consolidation has focused on the Danish experience of the early 1980s and stems from Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) . The authors focus on the trend of consumption following the contraction and estimate a consumption function. In particular, they find an unexpectedly high increase in private consumption after the fiscal contraction (see Figures 2  and 3 ). Empirically, this "consumption puzzle" takes the form of high forecast errors produced by the estimation of the consumption function. In their view, this can only be explained by expectations of lower taxes and therefore higher disposable income in the future. On a whole, therefore, they see strong empirical support for the "German" or expectations view in the data.
One problem of the Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) study, however, is the specification of the consumption function, which is of the Hayashi (1982) type. The Hayashi formulation explicitly takes into account changes in labor income and wealth, but it rests crucially on the assumption that real interest rates are constant (see Hayashi 1982, 897) .
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The Danish experience, however, is characterized by a large decrease in short-and long-term interest rates (see Figure 4 , upper panel). As mentioned, nominal interest rates fell sharply: Government bond yields, for example, declined from 21.2% in 1982:2 to 9.1% in 1986:2. The sharpest decline in interest rates occurred at the outset of the con-solidation. In 1983, the short-term call money rate, for example, dropped by almost 5 percentage points from the first to the second quarter. Given price stickiness in output markets, this also implied a decline in real interest rates. The real rate of interest fell by more than 5 percentage points in 2 months in 1983 and remained at "unusually" low levels until 1986 (see Figure 2 , lower panel).
The influence of the interest rate on spending out of a given income is often supposed to be rather small. Keynes considered it to be unimportant. However, with the exception of large changes in the interest rate, 8 in the classical view of consumption and saving, the income effect may outweigh the substitution effect linked to interest rate changes, but the net effect is generally assumed to be negligible. How-
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PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW Figure 2 ever, if the interest rate changes by large magnitudes, the opposing effects may not balance any more. For example, if the interest rate is significantly below its "normal" level in one period, this provides strong reasons to anticipate consumption as suggested by the substitution effect, and this may-given the short period-not be offset by the income effect. Moreover, when wealth takes the form of capital assets Figure 3 yielding a fixed income, a decrease in the interest rate causes an increase in the capital value and thus in the value of wealth, which in turn raises consumption. In Denmark, this force has obviously played an important role because a large part of household wealth is traditionally held in assets that yield a fixed income (see Figure 4 , lower panel).
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Given the large changes in real interest rates in Denmark in the 1980s 632 PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW Figure 4 and the importance of (larger) changes in the real interest rate for private consumption, we include the real interest rate in the consumption equation. It will be shown that this reduces the unexplained portion of the consumption increase and leaves little room for an expansionary "German" effect caused by the expectation of lower taxes or higher incomes in the future. 
INTEREST RATES AND THE CONSUMPTION PUZZLE
We adopt the life cycle/permanent income approach to consumption-with its ingredients of intertemporal optimization and absence of borrowing constraints-by assuming that consumers do not base their consumption decisions simply on current income but that they maximize their utility over a longer time horizon. The resulting consumption level is a fraction of permanent income. Hall (1978) , in his influential work on the first-order condition (the Euler equation), derived the empirical implication of this approach: To explain current consumption from lagged variables, only its one-period lagged value is significant. Once this is taken into account, all other variables, particularly lagged income, have no further explanatory power. Like Hayashi (1982) , Hall assumes in his derivation that the real rate of interest is constant over time (Hall 1978, 974) . In the case of Denmark, however, this assumption must be relaxed. If the real interest rate is variable and uncertain, the "drift" term of the Hall model becomes a function of expectations of future real rates (Wickens and Molana 1984) .
Therefore, the consumer maximizes a utility function over his or her lifetime horizon by choosing levels of consumption and assets. Given uncertainty, it is the expected utility function that is being maximized on the basis of the available information.
The specification of the utility function is crucial in determining whether the impact of the real interest rate on consumption is positive or negative from a theoretical perspective and in analyzing the role of the substitution and wealth effects. However, the aim of this article is not to discuss a particular form of the utility function but to empiri-cally test the existence of a consumption puzzle. We therefore consider a general Hall-type equation, 11 which abstracts from a particular form of the utility function and includes the expected real interest rate as a regressor. Therefore, our estimate of the coefficient of the expected future real interest rate refers to the overall relationship between changes in the level of the interest rate and in the level of consumption (a specific analysis of the wealth effect is addressed in the next section, and a model of the relationship between the interest rate and aggregate consumption-rather than consumption of a representative agent model-will be discussed and tested in Section 5).
We therefore estimate the following logarithmic equation:
log log log( )
where r e is the expected real interest rate, and ε J + is an error orthogonal to the information set available at time t.
In specifying the intertemporal consumption choice between periods t and t + 1, the natural option may seem to include the actual interest rate at time t as the rate at which wealth is carried forward to time t + 1. However, as household wealth in Denmark mainly is in the form of assets yielding a fixed income, the value of wealth at t + 1 is determined by the interest rate at t + 1, which is still unknown at time t. The expected interest rate seems therefore the appropriate choice for the regression.
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We estimate equation (1) by ordinary least squares (OLS) both with quarterly and yearly data (for a description of the data and sources used, see the appendix). Consumption is in real terms, and the quarterly series is seasonally adjusted, in billions of Danish kroners. The expected real interest rate is derived from a vector autoregression (VAR) for inflation, long-and short-run nominal interest rates, estimated over 1970 to 1993. 13 The expected rate of inflation is the fitted inflation from this process. Subtracting it from the long-run nominal interest rate gives the expected real interest rate used in the regression (we use the same method as in Giavazzi and Pagano [1990] to obtain similar values for the expected real interest rate and facilitate the comparison with their results).
Estimating (1) The adjusted R 2 and the value for the F-test are a result of the high significance level of the two coefficients; the standard error of the equation σ and the residual sum of squares are both low, at about 1.8%. The diagnostic tests do not point toward specification problems: The AR and ARCH tests do not reject the H 0 of no autocorrelation and homoscedasticity, the Jarque Bera Normality Test does not reject normality of the residuals, and the Reset Test does not reject homoscedasticity. The equation therefore seems not misspecified.
These findings allow the inference of a significant negative relationship between consumption and the expected real interest rate.
Estimating (1) The results and the specification are broadly confirmed on annual data. Table 1 . They are significantly smaller than those obtained by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) , without the expected real interest rate as the regressor, which is also given in Table 1 .
For the annual data, the estimation of our regression for the period 1970-1983 gives the estimates b 0 = .832 and b 1 = -.057, with R 2 = .92. Computation of the forecast errors by the same procedure yields values that are once again smaller than those of Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) in the specification without interest rates (see Table 1 ).
The results underline that the direct test of the influence of the expected real interest rate on consumption is able to explain much of what happened in Denmark after 1982. The importance of the fall in the interest rate in triggering consumption at the outset of fiscal consolidation is also recognized in the report by the Danish Ministry for Economic Affairs. The report states that "the main elements in the initial upswing were the unusual shift in private consumption and housing construction prompted, inter alia, by the unexpectedly large drop in interest rates" (Ministry for Economic Affairs 1985, 1).
The unusually high forecast errors found by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) for the period 1984-1987 may thus be traced back to the omission of the interest rate as a regressor in a period of large changes in this variable. With the interest rate being included, we do not find ex-
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PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW The forecast errors for the specification "with real interest rate" taken into account are derived from the estimation as explained in the text; the forecast errors for the specification "without real interest rate" are taken from Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) .
ceptionally large forecast errors and hence no consumption puzzle during 1984 to 1987. 15 An open question remains whether the rise in consumption is better explained by the unexpected portion (the "surprise") of the decreases in the real interest rate, as argued here, or in the future tax burden, as the expectations view would argue. The specification of the consumption function above allows us to test this directly, and this will be done in the following section.
MODELING THE "SURPRISES"
The error term of our estimating equation has the qualitycommon to Hall-type equations in the life cycle/permanent income framework-of being correlated with the surprise in permanent income. This surprise in permanent income can be split up into three components: the three surprises in labor earnings, in nonlabor earnings, and in taxes. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) argue that it is the surprise in taxes, resulting from the projected decrease in government expenditure, that mainly explains the consumption puzzle. Instead, we test whether it is the surprise in nonlabor earnings (i.e., from wealth), itself being a result of the surprise in the interest rate, that explains the large increase in consumption. The reason why changes in the interest rate can be expected to have a considerable impact on wealth is that in Denmark, wealth is predominantly held in assets paying fixed annuities. Therefore, an interest rate decline raises the value of wealth and hence the earnings flow from the realization of capital gains.
To approximate the surprise in the expected future path of taxes, we assume it to be proportional to the current unanticipated change in government expenditure G. Equally, we approximate the surprise in the future path of nonlabor earnings (wealth) by assuming it to be proportional to the current unanticipated change in the real interest rate.
As for taxes, we start from the intertemporal government intertemporal budget constraint 
where G, T, and B represent government expenditure, taxes, and debt, respectively. The surprise in the path of future taxes is equal to the surprise in the path of future government expenditure. This surprise shall be defined as the present value of the difference between the old and the new expected paths of government expenditure. To approximate this value, we follow Flavin (1981) in assuming that the discounted value of G is linear in present and future values and that G follows an autoregressive process. Under this assumption, the present value of the difference in the old and new expected path of G is proportional to the current surprise in G.
We construct a variable for expected public consumption from a VAR process with two lags for general government consumption G and general government deficit (OECD, Analytical Database) for 1970 to 1993. The residuals of the fitted expected government consumption correspond to the surprise in taxes, which, according to the expectations view, should explain the forecast errors of the private consumption regression (this surprise is called ResG below). However, because the fiscal consolidation changed the ratio between G and T in the period under consideration-by lowering government consumption and raising taxes-we construct another proxy for the surprise in taxes, which does not necessarily follow government consumption but is derived from a VAR process with two lags for general government revenues and the government balance (called ResT below).
The surprise in the real interest rate was already obtained in the VAR process of the previous section because the surprise in the real interest rate is the surprise in the nominal interest rate minus the surprise in inflation. We therefore use the residuals (called "Resr" below) obtained from this computation. From the previous section, the surprise in the real interest rate should be negatively correlated with consumption, and its introduction as a regressor in (1) should help reduce the dynamic forecast errors. The regression thus becomes (with t-statistics in parentheses; estimated on 1970-1983 data) the following: 
The forecast errors for 1984 to 1987, defined as in the previous section, are given in Table 2 . They are lower than in the specification of the previous section (cf. Table 1 , third data row), implying that the surprise in the real interest rate can help explain the consumption pattern further.
What about the surprise in taxes? Does it help reduce the forecast error? The answer is negative. In fact, this is true with and without the real interest rate being included in the regression, and the estimated parameter for tax surprises as a regressor is always insignificant.
We report the results for the case without the interest rate, for if the surprises in taxes are insignificant here, they will not become significant when the interest rate is included. The estimation with the surprise in taxes approximated by the surprise in government consumption (ResG, as defined above; estimation period 1970-1983; t-statistics in parentheses) yields the following: NOTE: ResG is the surprise in taxes approximated by the trend in government consumption G; ResT is the surprise in taxes approximated by the trend in government revenues T.
The resulting forecast errors (see Table 2 ) are hardly lower than those in the previous section (cf. Table 1 , fourth data row), suggesting that the surprise in taxes does not help explain the consumption boom. A similar conclusion is reached also from the other specification of the surprise in taxes ResT, which is based on the surprise in government revenues, as defined above: Again, the forecast errors are not lowered (see Table 2 ), which is not surprising given that the coefficient of ResT is insignificant too.
These findings do not lend much support to the expectations view, at least not in the form of an autonomous relevance of the expectations about the future tax burden, in whichever way it may be proxied. Both tax proxies used were insignificant and had no effect on lowering the forecast errors. However, a variable for government expenditure can be used to improve the explanatory power of our equation in a different way, as shown in the next section.
AN AGGREGATE CONSUMPTION FUNCTION AND ITS ESTIMATION
We adopt (but modify) a simple model of aggregate consumption from Gylfason (1981) to test the interest rate/consumption relationship further. The model is nested in the framework of the permanent income hypothesis. Consumption C is a fraction c of permanent income Y p :
For the reasons mentioned above, we include in Y p the expected real interest rate, defined as the difference between the nominal interest rate and the expected rate of inflation:
If the interest rate varies over time, the parameter c cannot be considered as constant:
To derive an estimatable consumption function, we take semiloglinear approximations of (5) and (6):
Therefore, log log log + ? ;
log ( / ) ( ) ( )
If equation (10) is interpreted as describing the desired propensity to consume (C/Y)*, and if it is further assumed that the actual propensity to consume (C/Y) partially adjusts to the difference between the desired and the actual propensity to consume of the preceding period, one obtains ( ) log ( / ) log ( / ) ( ) log / + ; + ; + ;
Substituting and rearranging yields
which can be rewritten as the estimating equation 
where constant = λ(c 0 + y 0 ), β 0 = (1 -λ), and β 1 = λ(c 1 + y 1 ). The test values reflect significance of the coefficients and do not suggest any misspecification. The magnitude of b 1 implies that a decrease in the expected interest rate by 1 percentage point increases the propensity to consume (C/Y) by .6%, which is a considerable sensitivity. Once again, a regression of the change in log (C/Y) against a constant and the expected real interest rate confirms that the result is independent of the stationarity property of the dependent variable:
which yields (with t-statistics in parentheses) We now test if fitting equation (13) to the data still cannot explain the increase in consumption for the period [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] . As in the previous section, the regression is estimated over 1971 to 1983 (obtaining b 0 = .83 and b 1 = .0056, both significant at the 1% level), and the forecast errors resulting from fitting the estimated equation to [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] are 0.38%, 0.22%, 0.01%, and 0.20%. Even if they have a positive sign, their very small magnitude (they are actually smaller than the forecast errors obtained in Section 3; see Table 1 ) leaves little room for a "puzzle."
CONCLUSIONS
The preceding analysis of the Danish fiscal consolidation has shown that large drops in the interest rate can be an important transmission channel for the overall success of fiscal consolidation. They can help boost private consumption demand and thereby offset the contractionary effect of consolidation itself. In conclusion, however, two issues must be kept in mind that played a crucial role in Denmark and may limit a generalization of the policy outcomes to other economies.
First, in bringing interest rates down, not only the fiscal deficit reduction itself was important but also the increased stability in the external sector through a credible announcement of a stable exchange rate. The latter helped reduce the risk premium for exchange rate changes and was underscored by the rapidly narrowing interest rate differential vis-à-vis other countries within the ERM. Second, in making the interest rate consumption channel work, the wealth effect has been vital in shifting consumption from the future to the present. Because in Denmark a paramount fraction of wealth is traditionally held in assets paying fixed annuities, their value soared due to the interest decline. Moreover, greater stability in financial and exchange rate markets may boost consumer and investor confidence.
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Even within these limitations, however, there are cases to which the Danish experience could apply. Italy and Greece, for example, have economies with unsustainable levels of public deficit and debt and large fractions of household wealth in assets with fixed annuities. Therefore, the interest rate channel could be important in supporting positive effects of fiscal consolidation. As Europe is preparing for monetary union, countries that do not enter in the first stage (the "periphery" countries) are likely to experience sharply rising interest differentials vis-à-vis the "core" countries of the union. The periphery countries, as well as future entrants into the European Union from Eastern Europe, could become relevant cases for fiscal consolidation and the interest channel on consumption and output in the future. 
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NOTES
1. See Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and, for more recent treatments, Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997) and Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) .
2. For more details, see, for example, Ministry of Economic Affairs (1983) or Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 1983, 8-22) .
consistencies (see Carlucci and D'Elia 1985) ; therefore, the vector autoregression (VAR) approach is still frequently used in the literature, including by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) , to whose results we contrast ours.
14. Studies on Latin America (Rebelo and Vegh 1995; Reinhart and Vegh 1995) argue that plausible values of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution are unlikely to generate the consumption booms observed in these countries following economic stabilization. However, as argued before, in Denmark the wealth increase following the drop in interest rates may have been the main determining factor for the negative relationship between interest rates and consumption.
15. Based on our findings, there is, by implication, no need to explain why the puzzle apparently vanished after 1987, when fiscal consolidation efforts were reversed. This has been a further issue that authors who found a puzzle had to struggle with.
16. Consumption and saving decisions have been recently analyzed with reference to the index of consumer confidence (see Giovannini and Peronaci 1992; Locarno and Parigi 1995) . But including the Danish index of consumer confidence (source: European Economy) in the regressions of this article reveals the presence of multicollinearity, as might be expected. Replacing the expected real interest rate as an explanatory variable by the confidence index shows that in this case, the index performs less well as an explanatory variable than the interest rate.
